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Abstract
A discourse strategy is a strategy for commu-
nicating with another agent. Designing effec-
tive dialogue systems requires designing agents
that can choose among discourse strategies.
We claim that the design of effective strate-
gies must take cognitive factors into account,
propose a new method for testing the hypothe-
sized factors, and present experimental results
on an effective strategy for supporting deliber-
ation. The proposed method of computational
dialogue simulation provides a new empirical
basis for computational linguistics.
1 Introduction
A discourse strategy is a strategy for communicating
with another agent. Agents make strategy choices via
decisions about when to talk, when to let the other agent
talk, what to say, and how to say it. One choice a conver-
sational agent must make is whether an utterance should
include some relevant, but optional, information in what
is communicated. For example, consider 1:
(1) a. Let’s walk along Walnut St.
b. It’s shorter.
The speaker made a strategic choice in 1 to include
1b since she could have simply said 1a. What determines
the speaker’s choice?
Existing dialogue systems have two modes for dealing
with optional information: (1) include all optional infor-
mation that is not already known to the hearer; (2) in-
clude no optional information [Moore and Paris, 1993].
But these modes are simply the extremes of possibility
and to my knowledge, no previous work has proposed
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any principles for when to include optional information,
or any way of testing the proposed principles to see how
they are affected by the conversants and their processing
abilities, by the task, by the communication channel, or
by the domain.
This paper presents a new experimental method for
determining whether a discourse strategy is effective and
presents experimental results on a strategy for support-
ing deliberation. The method is based on earlier sim-
ulation work by Carletta and Pollack [Carletta, 1992,
Pollack and Ringuette, 1990]. Section 2 outlines hy-
potheses about the factors that affect which strategies
are effective. Section 3 presents a new method for testing
the role of the hypothesized factors. The experimental
results in section 4 show that effective strategies to sup-
port deliberation are determined by both cognitive and
task variables.
2 Deliberation in Discourse
Deliberation is the process by which an agent de-
cides what to believe and what to do [Galliers, 1991,
Doyle, 1992]. One strategy that supports deliberation
is the Explicit-Warrant strategy, as in 1. The warrant
in 1b can be used by the hearer in deliberating whether
to accept or reject the speaker’s proposal in 1a.1
An analysis of proposals in a corpus of 55 problem-
solving dialogues shows that communicating agents
don’t always include warrants in a proposal, and sug-
gest a number of hypotheses about which factors affect
their decision [Walker, 1993, Pollack et al., 1982].
Consider a situation in which an agent A wants an
agent B to accept a proposal P. If B is a ‘helpful’ agent
(nonautonomous), B will accept A’s proposal without a
warrant. Alternatively, if B deliberates whether to ac-
cept P, but B knows of no competing options, then P will
1The relation between a warrant and the propose
communicative act is similar to the motivation relation
of [Moore and Paris, 1993, Mann and Thompson, 1987]. A
warrant is always optional; this is consistent with the RST
framework in which all satellites are optional information.
TO WARRANT OR NOT
B not accept without warrant B will accept without a warrant
YES
B doesn’t know warrant B knows warrant warrant is required for task warrant is not required for task
YES
NO
warrant is salient (for B) warrant is not salient(for B)
NO YES
communication is cheaper than retrieval
retrieval is indeterminate
YES
NO
retrieval is cheaper than communication
Figure 1: Potential Factors of Decision in whether to use the Explicit-Warrant strategy
be the best option whether or not A tells B the warrant
for P. Since a warrant makes the dialogue longer, the
Explicit-Warrant strategy might be inefficient whenever
either of these situations hold.
Now consider a situation where B is an autonomous
agent [Galliers, 1991]. B always deliberates every pro-
posal and B probably knows of options which compete
with proposal P. Then B cannot decide whether to ac-
cept P without a warrant. Supposedly agent A should
omit a warrant is if it is already believed by B, so that
the speaker in 1 would not have said It’s shorter if she
believed that the hearer knew that the Walnut St. route
was shorter. However, consider 2, said in discussing
which Indian restaurant to go to for lunch:
(2) a. Listen to Ramesh.
b. He’s Indian.
The warrant in 2b was included despite the fact that it
was common knowledge among the conversants. Its in-
clusion violates the rule ofDon’t tell people facts that they
already know.2 Clearly the rule does not hold. These
already-known warrants are a type of information-
ally redundant utterance, henceforth IRU, which
are surprisingly frequent in naturally-occurring dialogue
[Walker, 1993].
A Warrant IRU such as that in 2 suggests that B’s
cognitive limitations may be a factor in what A chooses
to say, so that even if B knows a warrant for adopt-
ing A’s proposal, what is critical is whether the war-
rant is salient for B, i.e. whether the warrant is al-
ready accessible in B’s working memory [Prince, 1981,
Baddeley, 1986]. If the warrant is not already salient,
2The warrant having the desired effect of getting the
hearer to listen to Ramesh depends on the hearer previously
believing or coming to believe that Indians know of good
Indian restaurants [Webber and Joshi, 1982].
then B must either infer or retrieve the warrant infor-
mation or obtain it from an external source in order to
evaluate A’s proposal. Thus A’s strategy choice may de-
pend on A’s model of B’s attentional state, as well as the
costs of retrieval and inference as opposed to commu-
nication. In other words, A may decide that it is easier
to just say the warrant rather than require B to infer or
retrieve it.
Finally, the task determines whether there are penal-
ties for leaving a warrant implicit and relying on B to
infer or retrieve it. Some tasks require that two agents
agree on the reasons for adopting a proposal, e.g. in or-
der to ensure robustness in situations of environmental
change. Other tasks, such as a management/union nego-
tiation, only require the agents to agree on the actions to
be carried out and each agent can have its own reasons
for wanting those actions to be done without affecting
success in the task.
Figure 1 summarizes these hypotheses by propos-
ing a hypothetical decision tree for an agent’s choice
of whether to use the Explicit-Warrant strategy. The
choice is hypothesized to depend on cognitive proper-
ties of B, e.g. what B knows, B’s attentional state, and
B’s processing capabilities, as well as properties of the
task and the communication channel. To my knowledge,
all previous work on dialogue has simply assumed that
an agent should never tell an agent facts that the other
agent already knows. The hypotheses in figure 1 seem
completely plausible, but the relationship of cognitive ef-
fort to dialogue behavior has never been explored. Given
these hypotheses, what is required is a way to test the
hypothesized relationship of task and cognitive factors to
effective discourse strategies. Section 3 describes a new
method for testing hypotheses about effective discourse
strategies in dialogue.
3 Design-World
Design-World is an experimental environment for test-
ing the relationship between discourse strategies, task
parameters and agents’ cognitive capabilities, simi-
lar to the single agent TileWorld simulation environ-
ment [Pollack and Ringuette, 1990, Hanks et al., 1993].
Design-World agents can be parametrized as to discourse
strategy, and the effects of this strategy can be mea-
sured against a range of cognitive and task parame-
ters. This paper compares the Explicit-Warrant strategy
to the All-Implicit strategy as strategies for supporting
deliberation. Other strategies tested in Design-World
are presented elsewhere [Walker, 1993, Walker, 1994a,
Rambow and Walker, 1994].
3.1 Design World Domain and Task
ROOM # 1 ROOM # 2
DESIGN WORLD COLLABORATIVE PLAN: 434 points
KEY:
G F
F
P
G
P
G
G
F = FUCHSIA
G = GREEN
P= PURPLE
55
53
55
56
55
54
52
54
Figure 2: One Final State for Design-World Standard
Task: Represents the Collaborative Plan Achieved by
the Dialogue, 434 points
The Design-World task requires two agents to carry
out a dialogue in order to negotiate an agreement
on the design of the floor plan of a two room house
[Whittaker et al., 1993]. The design-house plan re-
quires the agents to agree on how to design-room-1 and
design-room-2. Both agents know what the design-
house plan requires and start out with a set of furniture
pieces that can be used to design each room.
To negotiate an agreement, each agent carries out
means-end reasoning about the furniture pieces that they
have that can be used in the floor plan. Means-end rea-
soning generates options – these options are the content
of proposals to the other agent to put a piece of furni-
ture into one of the rooms. Dialogue 3 illustrates agents’
communication for part of designing room-1, including
both the artificial language that the agents communicate
with and a gloss generated from that language in italics:
(3)
1: BILL: First, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-10: put-act (agent-
bill green rug room-1))
2: KIM: Next, let’s put the green lamp there.
2:(propose agent-kim agent-bill option-33: put-act (agent-
kim green lamp room-1))
3: BILL: Then, let’s put the green couch in the study.
(propose agent-bill agent-kim option-45: put-act (agent-
bill green couch room-1))
4: KIM: No, instead let’s put in the purple couch.
(reject agent-kim agent-bill option-56: put-act (agent-kim
purple couch room-1))
On receiving a proposal, an agent deliberates whether
to accept or reject the proposal [Doyle, 1992]. As po-
tential warrants to support deliberation, and to provide a
way of objectively evaluating agents’ performance, each
piece of furniture has a score. The score propositions
for all the pieces of furniture are stored in both agents’
memories at the beginning of the dialogue.
Agents reject a proposal if deliberation leads them
to believe that they know of a better option or if they
believe the preconditions for the proposal do not hold.
The content of rejections is determined by the collab-
orative planning principles, abstracted from ana-
lyzing four different types of problem solving dialogues
[Walker and Whittaker, 1990, Walker, 1994b]. For ex-
ample, in 3-4 Kim rejects the proposal in 3-3, and gives
as her reason that option-56 is a counter-proposal.
Proposals 1 and 2 are inferred to be implicitly ac-
cepted because they are not rejected
[Walker and Whittaker, 1990, Walker, 1992]. If a pro-
posal is accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, then
the option that was the content of the proposal becomes
a mutual intention that contributes to the final design
plan [Power, 1984, Sidner, 1992]. A potential final de-
sign plan negotiated via a dialogue is shown in figure
2.
3.2 Varying Discourse Strategies
The Design-World experiments reported here compare
the All-Implicit strategy with the Explicit-Warrant
strategy. Agents are parametrized for different discourse
strategies by placing different expansions of discourse
plans in their plan libraries. Discourse plans are plans for
proposal, rejection, acceptance, clarification,
opening and closing. The only variations discussed
here are variations in the expansions of proposals.
The All-Implicit strategy is an expansion of a dis-
course plan to make a proposal, in which a proposal
decomposes trivially to the communicative act of pro-
pose. In dialogue 3, both Design-World agents commu-
nicate using the All-Implicit strategy, and the proposals
are shown in utterances 1, 2, and 3. The All-Implicit
strategy never includes warrants in proposals, leaving it
up to the other agent to retrieve them from memory.
The Explicit-Warrant strategy expands the proposal
discourse act to be a warrant followed by a propose
utterance. Since agents already know the point values
for pieces of furniture, warrants are always IRUs in the
experiments here. For example, 4-1 is a warrant for
the proposal in 4-2: The names of agents who use the
Explicit-Warrant strategy are a numbered version of the
string “IEI” to help the experimenter keep track of the
simulation data files; IEI stands for Implicit acceptance,
Explicit warrant, Implicit opening and closing.
(4)
1: IEI: Putting in the green rug is worth 56.
(say agent-iei agent-iei2 bel-10: score (option-10: put-act
(agent-iei green rug room-1) 56))
2: IEI: Then, let’s put the green rug in the study.
(propose agent-iei agent-iei2 option-10: put-act (agent-iei
green rug room-1))
3: IEI2: Putting in the green lamp is worth 55.
(say agent-iei2 agent-iei bel-34: score (option-33: put-act
(agent-iei2 green lamp room-1) 55) )
4: IEI2: Then, let’s put the green lamp in the study.
(propose agent-iei2 agent-iei option-33: put-act (agent-iei2
green lamp room-1))
The fact that the green rug is worth 56 points sup-
ports deliberation about whether to adopt the intention
of putting the green rug in the study. The Explicit-
Warrant strategy models naturally occurring examples
such as those in 2b because the points information used
by the hearer to deliberate whether to accept or reject
the proposal is already mutually believed.
3.3 Cognitive and Task Parameters
Section 2 introduced a range of factors motivated by
the corpus analysis that were hypothesized to deter-
mine when Explicit-Warrant is an effective strategy.
This section discusses how Design-World supports the
parametrization of these factors.
The agent architecture for deliberation and means-
end reasoning is based on the IRMA architecture,
also used in the TileWorld simulation environment
[Pollack and Ringuette, 1990], with the addition of a
model of limited Attention/Working memory, AWM.
[Walker, 1993] includes a fuller discussion of the Design-
World deliberation and means-end reasoning mechanism
and the underlying mechanisms assumed in collaborative
planning.
We hypothesized that a warrant must be salient
for both agents (as shown by example 2b). In Design-
World, salience is modeled by AWM model, adapted
from [Landauer, 1975]. While the AWM model is ex-
tremely simple, Landauer showed that it could be param-
eterized to fit many empirical results on human memory
and learning [Baddeley, 1986]. AWM consists of a three
dimensional space in which propositions acquired from
perceiving the world are stored in chronological sequence
according to the location of a moving memory pointer.
The sequence of memory loci used for storage consti-
tutes a random walk through memory with each loci a
short distance from the previous one. If items are en-
countered multiple times, they are stored multiple times
[Hintzmann and Block, 1971].
When an agent retrieves items from memory, search
starts from the current pointer location and spreads out
in a spherical fashion. Search is restricted to a particu-
lar search radius: radius is defined in Hamming distance.
For example if the current memory pointer loci is (0 0 0),
the loci distance 1 away would be (0 1 0) (0 -1 0) (0 0 1)
(0 0 -1) (-1 0 0) (1 0 0). The actual locations are calcu-
lated modulo the memory size. The limit on the search
radius defines the capacity of attention/working memory
and hence defines which stored beliefs and intentions are
salient.
The radius of the search sphere in the AWM model is
used as the parameter for Design-World agents’ resource-
bound on attentional capacity. In the experiments be-
low, memory is 16x16x16 and the radius parameter
varies between 1 and 16, where AWM of 1 gives severely
attention limited agents and AWM of 16 means that ev-
erything an agent knows is accessible.3 This parameter
lets us distinguish between an agent’s ability to access
all the information stored in its memory, and the effort
involved in doing so.
The advantages of the AWM model is that it was
shown to reproduce, in simulation, many results on
human memory and learning. Because search starts
from the current pointer location, items that have been
stored most recently are more likely to be retrieved, pre-
dicting recency effects [Baddeley, 1986]. Because items
that are stored in multiple locations are more likely
to be retrieved, the model predicts frequency effects
[Hintzmann and Block, 1971]. Because items are stored
in chronological sequence, the model produces natural
associativity effects [Landauer, 1975]. Because delibera-
tion and means-end reasoning can only operate on salient
beliefs, limited attention produces a concomitant infer-
ential limitation, i.e. if a belief is not salient it cannot
3The size of memory was determined as adequate for pro-
ducing the desired level of variation in the current task across
all the experimental variables, while still making it possible
to run a large number of simulations over night when agents
have access to all of their memory. In order to use the AWM
model in a different task, the experimenter might want to
explore different sizes for memory.
be used in deliberation or means-end-reasoning. This
means that mistakes that agents make in their planning
process have a plausible cognitive basis. Agents can both
fail to access a belief that would allow them to produce
an optimal plan, as well as make a mistake in planning
if a belief about how the world has changed as a result
of planning is not salient. Depending on the preced-
ing discourse, and the agent’s attentional capacity, the
propositions that an agent knows may or may not be
salient when a proposal is made.
Another hypothetical factor was the relative cost of re-
trieval and communication. AWM also gives us a way to
measure the number of retrievals from memory in terms
of the number of locations searched to find a proposi-
tion. The amount of effort required for each retrieval
step is a parameter, as is the cost of each inference step
and the cost of each communicated message. These cost
parameters support modeling various cognitive architec-
tures, e.g. varying the cost of retrieval models different
assumptions about memory. For example, if retrieval is
free then all items in working memory are instantly ac-
cessible, as they would be if they were stored in registers
with fast parallel access. If AWM is set to 16, but re-
trieval isn’t free, the model approximates slow spreading
activation that is quite effortful, yet the agent still has
the ability to access all of memory, given enough time.
If AWM is set lower than 16 and retrieval isn’t free, then
we model slow spreading activation with a timeout when
effort exceeds a certain amount, so that an agent does
not have the ability to access all of memory.
It does not make sense to fix absolute values for
the retrieval, inference and communication cost pa-
rameters in relation to human processing. However,
Design-World supports exploring issues about the rel-
ative costs of various processes. These relative costs
might vary depending on the language that the agents
are communicating with, properties of the communi-
cation channel, how smart the agents are, how much
time they have, and what the demands of the task are
[Norman and Bobrow, 1975]. Below we vary the relative
cost of communication and retrieval.
Finally, we hypothesized that the Explicit-Warrant
strategy may be beneficial if the relationship between
the warrant and the proposal must be mutually believed.
Thus the definition of success for the task is a Design-
World parameter: the Standard task does not require a
shared warrant, whereas the Zero NonMatching Beliefs
task gives a zero score to any negotiated plan without
agreed-upon warrants.
3.4 Evaluating Performance
To evaluate performance, we compare the Explicit-
Warrant strategy with the All-Implicit strategy in sit-
uations where we vary the task requirements, agents’
attentional capacity, and the cost of retrieval, inference
and communication. Evaluation of the resulting design-
house plan is parametrized by (1) commcost: cost of
sending a message; (2) infcost: cost of inference; and
(3) retcost: cost of retrieval from memory:
performance
= Task Defined raw score
– (commcost × number of messages)
– (infcost × number of inferences)
– (retcost × number of retrieval steps)
raw score is task specific: in the Standard task we
simply summarize the point values of the furniture pieces
in each put-act in the final Design, while in the Zero
NonMatching Beliefs task, agents get no points for a plan
unless they agree on the reasons underlying each action
that contributes to the plan.
The way performance is defined reflects the
fact that agents are meant to collaborate on the
task. The costs that are deducted from the raw
score are the costs for both agents’ communica-
tion, inference, and retrieval. Thus performance
is a measure of least collaborative effort
[Clark and Schaefer, 1989, Brennan, 1990]. Since the
parameters for cognitive effort are fixed while discourse
strategy and AWM settings are varied, we can directly
test the benefits of different discourse strategies under
different assumptions about cognitive effort and the cog-
nitive demands of the task. This is impossible to do with
corpus analysis alone.
We simulate 100 dialogues at each parameter setting
for each strategy. Differences in performance distribu-
tions are evaluated for significance over the 100 dia-
logues using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two sample
test [Siegel, 1956].
A strategy A is beneficial as compared to a strategy
B, for a set of fixed parameter settings, if the difference in
distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample
test is significant at p < .05, in the positive direction, for
two or more AWM settings. A strategy is detrimental
if the differences go in the negative direction. Strategies
may be neither beneficial or detrimental, as there
may be no difference between two strategies.
4 Results: Explicit Warrant
This section discusses the results of comparing the
Explicit-Warrant discourse strategy with the All-
Implicit discourse strategy to determine when each strat-
egy is beneficial. We test 4 factors outlined in figure
1: when the warrant is salient or not, when the war-
rant is required for the task or not, when the costs of
retrieval and communication vary, and when retrieval is
indeterminate.
Differences in performance between the Explicit-
Warrant strategy and the All-Implicit strategy are shown
via a difference plot such as figure 3. In figure 3 per-
formance differences are plotted on the Y-axis and AWM
settings are shown on the X-axis. If the plot is above
the dotted line for 2 or more AWM settings, then the
Explicit-Warrant strategy may be beneficial depend-
ing on whether the differences are significant by the KS
test. Each point represents the difference in the means of
100 runs of each strategy at a particular AWM setting.
These plots summarize the results of 1800 simulated di-
alogues: 100 for each AWM setting for each strategy.
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Figure 3: If Retrieval is Free, Explicit-Warrant is detri-
mental at AWM of 3,4,5: Strategy 1 of two Explicit-
Warrant agents and strategy 2 of two All-Implicit agents:
Task = Standard, commcost = 1, infcost = 1, retcost =
0
Dialogues in which one or both agents use the Explicit-
Warrant strategy are more efficient when retrieval has a
cost.
Figure 3 shows that the Explicit-Warrant strategy is
detrimental at AWM of 3,4,5 for the Standard task,
in comparison with the All-Implicit strategy, if retrieval
from memory is free (KS 3,4,5 > .19, p < .05). This
is because making the warrant salient displaces infor-
mation about other pieces of furniture when agents are
attention-limited. In the Standard task, agents aren’t
required to share beliefs about the value of a proposal,
so remembering what pieces they have is more important
cost - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 1 , I = 1 , R = 0.01
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Figure 4: Retrieval costs: Strategy 1 is two Explicit-
Warrant agents and strategy 2 is two All-Implicit agents:
Task = Standard, commcost = 1, infcost = 1, retcost =
.01
than remembering their value.
However, figure 4 shows that Explicit-Warrant is ben-
eficial when retrieval is one tenth the cost of commu-
nication and inference. By AWM values of 3, perfor-
mance with Explicit-Warrant is better than All-Implicit
because the beliefs necessary for deliberation are made
salient with each proposal (KS for AWM of 3 and above
> .23, p < .01). At AWM parameter settings of 16,
where agents have the ability to search all their beliefs
for warrants, the saving in processing time is substantial.
Again at the lowest AWM settings, the strategy is not
beneficial because it displaces information about other
pieces from AWM. However in figure 4, in contrast with
figure 3, retrieval has an associated cost. Thus the sav-
ings in retrieval balance out with the loss of raw score
so that the strategy is not detrimental. Other experi-
ments show that even when the relative cost of retrieval
is .0001, that Explicit-Warrant is still beneficial at AWM
settings of 11 and 16 (KS for 11,16 > .23 , p < .01).
Explicit Warrant is detrimental if
Communication is Expensive
If we change the relative costs of the different processes
in the situation, we change whether a strategy is bene-
ficial. Figure 5 shows that if communication cost is 10,
and inference and retrieval are free, then the Explicit-
Warrant strategy is detrimental (KS for AWM 1 to
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Figure 5: If Communication is Expensive: Communica-
tion costs can dominate other costs in dialogues. Strat-
egy 1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and strategy 2 is
two All-Implicit agents: Task = Standard, commcost =
10, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
5 > .23, p< .01). This is because the Explicit-Warrant
strategy increases the number of utterances required to
perform the task; it doubles the number of messages in
every proposal. If communication is expensive compared
to retrieval, communication cost can dominate the other
benefits.
Explicit Warrant Achieves a High Level of
Agreement
If we change the definition of success in the task, we
change whether a strategy is beneficial. When the task
is Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs, the Explicit-Warrant strat-
egy is beneficial even if retrieval is free (KS > .23 for
AWM from 2 to 11, p < .01) The warrant information
that is redundantly provided is exactly the information
that is needed in order to achieve matching beliefs about
the warrants for intended actions. The strategy virtually
guarantees that the agents will agree on the reasons for
carrying out a particular course of action. The fact that
retrieval is indeterminate produces this effect; a simi-
lar result is obtained when warrants are required and
retrieval costs something.
To my great surprise, the beneficial effect of Explicit-
Warrant for the Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs task is so ro-
bust that even if communication cost is 10 and retrieval
and inference are free, Explicit-Warrant is better than
match - iei-iei2 bill-kim C= 10 , I = 0 , R = 0
Attention/Working Memory
CO
MP
OS
ITE
 Sc
ore
 Di
ffe
ren
ce
s
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-
20
0
-
10
0
0
10
0
20
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 6: Explicit-Warrant is STILL beneficial: Strategy
1 is two Explicit-Warrant agents and strategy 2 is two
All-Implicit agents: Task = Zero-Nonmatching-Beliefs,
commcost = 10, infcost = 0, retcost = 0
All-Implicit at AWM of 3 . . . 11 (KS > .23, p < .01).
See figure 6. In other words, even when every extra
warrant message incurs a penalty of 10 points, if the
task is Zero-NonMatching-Beliefs, agents using Explicit-
Warrant do better. Contrast figure 6 with the Standard
task and same cost parameters in 5.
These result suggests that including warrants is highly
effective when agents must agree on a specific warrant,
if they are attention-limited to any extent.
5 Conclusion
This paper has discussed an instance of a general prob-
lem in the design of conversational agents: when to in-
clude optional information. We presented and tested a
number of hypotheses about the factors that contribute
to the decision of when to include a warrant in a pro-
posal. We showed that warrants are useful when the task
requires agreement on the warrant, when the warrant is
not currently salient, when retrieval of the warrant is in-
determinate, or when retrieval has some associated cost,
and that warrants hinder performance if communication
is costly and if the warrant can displace information that
is needed to complete the task, e.g. when AWM is very
limited and warrants are not required to be shared.
The method used here is a new experimental
methodology for computational linguistics that supports
testing hypotheses about beneficial discourse strate-
gies [Carletta, 1992, Pollack and Ringuette, 1990]. The
Design-World environment is based on a cognitive model
of limited attention and supports experiments on the in-
teraction of discourse strategies with agents’ cognitive
limitations. The use of the method and the focus of
this work are novel: previous work has focused on deter-
mining underlying mechanisms for cooperative strategies
rather than on investigating when a strategy is effective.
To my knowledge, no previous work on dialogue has
ever argued that conversational agents’ resource limits
are a major factor in determining effective conversational
strategies in collaboration. The results presented here
suggest that cooperative strategies cannot be defined in
the abstract, but cooperation arises from the interac-
tion of two agents in dialogue. If one agent has lim-
ited working memory, then the other agent can make
the dialogue go more smoothly by adopting a strat-
egy that makes deliberative premises salient. In other
words, strategies are cooperative for certain conversa-
tional partners, under particular task definitions, for par-
ticular communication situations.
Here we compared two discourse strategies: All-
Implicit and Explicit-Warrant. Explicit-Warrant is a
type of discourse strategy called an Attention strategy
in [Walker, 1993] because its main function is to manip-
ulate agents’ attentional state. Elsewhere we show that
(1) some IRU strategies are only beneficial when infer-
ential complexity is higher than in the Standard Task
[Rambow and Walker, 1994, Walker, 1994a]; (2) IRUs
that make inferences explicit can help inference lim-
ited agents perform as well as logically omniscient ones
[Walker, 1993].
Although much work remains to be done, there is rea-
son to believe that these results are domain independent.
The simplicity of the Design-World task means that its
structure is a subcomponent of many other tasks. The
model of limited resources is cognitively based, but the
cost parameters support modeling different agent archi-
tectures, and we explored the effects of different cost
parameters. The Explicit-Warrant strategy is based on
simple relationships between different facts which we
would expect to occur in any domain, i.e. the fact that
some belief can be used as a warrant for accepting a
proposal should occur in almost any task. Future work
should extend these results, showing that a ‘cooperative
strategy’ need not always be ‘cooperative’, and investi-
gate additional factors that determine when strategies
are effective.
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